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Abstract 
 
Using the multivariate regression methodology, we investigate the short-term 
effect of September 11, 2001 on US defense firms. Our findings suggest that the 
market differentiated among US defense firms based on the percentage of defense 
sales to total sales. In addition, the behaviour of the abnormal returns does not 
change when we use models that account for time variation of stock return 
volatility (GARCH). In the long-term, our results suggest that the US defense 
firms only outperform over a twelve-month period. However, the significant 
abnormal performance disappears over an eighteen-month period.  
 
JEL classification numbers: G14, G21, C22 
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1 Introduction  
The objective of this paper is to study the short- and long-term performance of the 
US defense industry in the aftermath of September 11. We would naturally expect 
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that US defense firms would be positively affected because of the potential 
increases in US defense spending. Indeed, the total cost of US military operations 
from fiscal year 2001 through May 2007 reached $610 billion (Congress Report 
Service, 2007 (CRS)). Of this total, CRS estimated that Operation Iraqi Freedom 
received about $450 billion (74%), Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) 
about $127 billion (21%), and enhanced base security about $28 billion (5%), as 
well as another $5 billion that CRS could not allocate (1%). The Congressional 
Budget Office estimated that war costs for the next 10 years could be anywhere 
from $1 trillion to $1.45 trillion by 2017. Some economists believe that the cost of 
the Iraq War could even exceed $2 trillion by 2015 (Bilmes and Stiglitz, 2006). 
Conversely, the impact of the event could be negative because of the existence of 
civilian activities in US defense firms. For example, Boeing, which is a very 
important contractor to the US Department of Defense, also has civilian activities 
and is in fact a major player in the aerospace industry. According to the CEO of 
Boeing, Phil Condit, the company has experienced the biggest downturn ever on 
the commercial side and a significant growth on the defense side (BBC interview, 
September 2, 2002). 
Several factors justify such studies. First, unlike the previous papers that studied 
the impact of the short-term effect of September 11 (Carter and Simkins, 2004; 
Chaudry, 2005; Chen and Siems, 2004, Hon, Strauss and Young, 2004; Karyoli 
and Martell, 2010), very few have studied the attack's long-term effect on stock 
prices (Chaudry, 2005; Richman, Santos and Barkoulas, 2006).3 Second, to the 
best of our knowledge, this research is the first to assess the performance of US 
defense firms after September 11. This contrasts with previous research focusing 
on the effect of September 11 on US firms in general (Carter, 2006; Chaudry, 
2005; Karyoli and Martell, 2010). Third, a similar attack could happen again. It 
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would be useful from a portfolio management perspective to identify those firms 
that would be less affected and to assess their performance. For instance, many 
corporate executives believe terrorism related business risks will increase in the 
coming years (Lloyd’s of London, 2007). 
 
In this investigation and for the short-term, we use a multivariate regression model 
methodology (MVRM) to assess the short-term effects of this event. The use of 
this technique allows us to test a number of hypotheses including whether the 
market reaction was uniform among defense firms or whether there was 
differentiation based on firm specific characteristics. 
 
To assess the long-term effect of September11 and given the sensitivity of 
abnormal performance to specific measurement methods, we use three different 
metrics. The first is the buy-and-hold return in excess of the market return. The 
second is the daily cumulative abnormal return, which is a less biased method for 
assessing the long-term return (Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). The last 
is the Fama and French multifactor model in which the daily calendar-time return 
on a portfolio of defense firms is regressed on three factors (Fama and French, 
1993). The model is used to control for event clustering and cross correlation in 
defense firms. The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we 
present the literature review and research questions. Section 3 presents the 
methodology. In section 4, we describe our sample. Section 5 presents the results, 
while section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Literature review and research questions  
A number of studies have investigated the short-term effect of September 11 on 
US financial markets. For example, Carter and Simkins (2004) study the reaction 
of US airline stocks to the September 11 attack. Their research indicates that 
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major and non-major airlines exhibit significant negative abnormal returns for 
September 11. Furthermore, the market reacted differently for various air transport 
firms. Chaudry (2005) investigates the return and time varying beta effect of the 
September 11 attack for 20 US firms and found that the direction of the effect 
varied according to the firms. In addition, not all firms experienced an increase in 
their beta. Cummins and Lewis (2003) analyze the returns of 43 property-casualty 
insurers and also find evidence of strong negative reactions to 9/11.Doherty, 
Lamm-Tennant and Starks (2003) develop a testable hypothesis on the 
cross-sectional variation in price reaction of insurance companies following 
September 11, employing capacity constraint, post loss investment and a variety 
of implicit insurance contract models, and find results in support of their 
hypothesis. Finally, Kallberg, Liu and Pasquariello (2008) analyze the behavior of 
New York real estate investment trusts in response to the 9/11 attack and report an 
initial positive reaction followed by downward revisions of expectations a couple 
of weeks after the attacks. 
Other research focuses on the short-term effect of September 11 on the world 
capital markets (Richman, Santos and Barkoulas, 2005; Chen and Siems, 2004; 
Hon, Strauss and Young, 2005). For example, Chen and Siems (2004) find that 
September 11 had a significant impact on the stock market around the world. Hon, 
Strauss and Young (2004) investigate the contagion effect of the September 11 
attack and report an increased correlation across global stock markets in the 
aftermath of September 11. Along the same line Eldor and Melnick (2004) show 
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that financial markets are efficient in pricing the shocks associated with terrorist 
attacks. Richman, Santos and Barkoulas (2005) document an increase in the level 
of systematic risk for 10 stock markets. The majority of industrial and emerging 
economies did not experience statistically significant increases in systematic risk 
in the post September 11 period. Dakos (2004) investigates the effects of terror 
attacks of September 11 on a set of airline stocks listed at various international 
stock markets. Utilizing the Market Model as the relevant return generating 
mechanism, he documents a structural break in systematic risk (beta) for airline 
stock. Nikkinen and   Vähämaa (2010)  examines the effects of terrorism on 
stock market sentiment by focusing on the behavior of expected probability 
density functions of the FTSE 100 index around September 11 attack. They find 
that terrorism has a strong adverse impact on stock market sentiment. In particular, 
terrorist attacks are found to cause a pronounced downward shift in the expected 
value of the FTSE 100 index and a significant increase in stock market uncertainty. 
More recently, Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman (2011) examine the impact of 
terrorism events (Including September 11 event) taking place in 25 countries over 
an 11-year period on the behaviour of stocks, bonds and the commodity market. 
They find that terrorist attacks have a significant effect on global, European, 
American, and Swiss markets. 
All these studies show that the September 11 event had a significant negative 
impact on stock returns around world. These studies used market indices in order 
to assess the impact of September 11 on the financial markets. 
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Despite the existence of a large academic literature on the subject, there are still 
unanswered questions regarding the short and long-term influences of the event on 
US defense firms, namely: 
What is the short-term effect of September 11 on US defense firms? 
Is the reaction to such an event uniform among all US defense firms? 
What is the long-term effect of September 11 on US defense firms? 
3. Methodology 
In this investigation, we use a multivariate regression model methodology 
(MVRM), similar to that used by Shipper and Thompson (1983) and Binder 
(1985a, 1985b), to assess the short-term effect of this event. The use of this 
technique will allow us to test a number of hypotheses including whether the 
market reaction was uniform among defense firms or whether there was 
differentiation based on firm specific characteristics. For example, a defense firm 
with civilian activities should react in a different way from a firm with strictly 
military activities. The use of this model is also helpful because it explicitly 
incorporates the contemporaneous dependence of the disturbances into the test 
statistic. This is important since the September 11 attack affected all firms during 
the same calendar time period, creating cross-sectional correlation of the error 
term. Therefore, we estimate a system of equations in which returns for each of 
our sample firms are represented as follows: 
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tiimtaiaitmiiti DRDDRR ,1., '' εδβαβα +++++=                (1) 
 
Where tiR ,  is the return on firm i at time t, tmR . is the return on the CRSP 
value-weighted market index at time t, aD is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one after September 11 and zero otherwise, 1D  is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one on September 11 and zero otherwise, iδ is the parameter 
used to measure the abnormal return on the event window for firm i, and ti,ε is the 
error term from the regression on date t for firm i. This term is treated as normally 
distributed with a mean of zero and a constant variance. We include parameters 
'α , 'β and aD to assess any shift in risk perceptions after the attacks.  Equation 1 
is estimated using returns for 250-day period around September 11 events. 
 
A number of hypotheses can be tested with the MVRM. We begin by testing 
whether significant abnormal returns occurred in response to the September 11 
attack.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): 0=iδ  
Rejection of H1 suggests that the market viewed the attack as having important 
implications for US defense firms and the information was updated in the stock 
prices.  
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We test an additional hypothesis to examine the overall economic significance of 
the market’s reaction to September 11. Hypothesis 2 tests whether the sum of the 
abnormal returns for each firm is zero. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): ∑ = 0iδ  
Rejection of H2 indicates that the abnormal returns of US defense firms are jointly 
non-zero which indicates a potential contagion effect in response to the attack. If 
H2 is rejected, we need to determine whether the abnormal returns were uniform 
among the different US defense firm. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): nδδδ == ......21  
 
To assess the long-term effect of September11 and given the sensitivity of 
abnormal performance to specific measurement methods, we use three different 
metrics. The first is the buy-and-hold return in excess of the market return. The 
second is the daily cumulative abnormal return, which is a less biased method for 
assessing the long-term return (Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). The last 
is the Fama and French multifactor model in which the daily calendar-time return 
on a portfolio of defense firms is regressed on three factors (Fama and French, 
1993). The model is used to control for event clustering and cross correlation in 
defense firms. 
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The Buy and Hold Return ( BHAR) for each firm from period T1 to T2 is 
calculated as follows: 
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Where itr  is the daily return for firm i on day t and mtr  is the return on the 
CRSP value-weighted market index for the same day. The holding period begins 
with the first trading after September 11 (T1). T2 is the last day of the holding 
period. For each holding period, we calculate equally-weighted and 
value-weighted average BHARs where the weight is the relative market 
capitalization of a defense firm in the sample. The statistical significance of the 
average buy and hold returns is calculated using two different procedures. The 
first one is the conventional t-statistic. The second procedure is the calculation of a 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic (Lyon and al., 1999). The bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic is computed as: 






++= γγ 
n
SSntsa 6
1
3
1 2
 whereγ is the estimate of the coefficient of skewness 
and Sn is the conventional t-statistic. 
The procedure was used to obtain an appropriate critical value when using the 
bootstrapping approach (Lyon and al. (1999)). 
 
We also calculate the abnormal performance using the cumulative abnormal return 
approach (CAR) since it is a less biased method to assess the long-term return 
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(Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). CARs are calculated as follows: 
( )∑
=
−=
2
1
21 ),(
T
Tt
mtitTT rrCAR                        (3) 
Where itr  is the daily return for firm i on day t and mtr  is the return on the 
CRSP value-weighted market index for the same day. The holding period starts 
with the first trading day after September 11, 2001. Both equally-weighted and 
value-weighted averages are calculated.  
 
An important issue in calculating the BHARs is to account for cross-sectional 
correlation between the long-horizon returns of different firms that may result in 
mis-specified test statistics. The calendar time approach is used to control for 
event clustering and cross correlation in defense firms. The Fama and French 
three-factor model is employed rather than the capital pricing model (CAPM) 
because of the well-known failure of the CAPM to describe the cross-section of 
expected returns (Fama and French, 1993).  For each calendar day, we form both 
equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios of defense firms. The returns of 
the portfolios are used to estimate the Fama and French three factor model as 
follows: 
( ) tttftmtftt HmlSMBrrrr ελγβα +++−+=−              (4) 
Where tr is the calendar time portfolio of defense firms on day t and ftr is the risk 
free return for the same day t. The independent variables of the regression are the 
excess market return ( ftmt rr − ), the difference in returns of value-weighted 
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portfolios of small firms and large stocks ( tSMB ), and the difference in returns of 
value-weighted portfolios of high book to market stocks and low book to market 
stocks ( tHML ). We have constructed the SMB and HML in keeping with Fama 
and French (1993). The intercept term α is used as an indicator of risk-adjusted 
performance of defense firms. 
 
4. Data 
The data source of defense firms is the 2001 edition of the world's top 100 defense 
firms, a ranking published annually since 1991 by a defense news media group. 
The ranking is based on annual defense sales. Our initial sample comprises 42 US 
firms. Of these, we drop 20 firms due to a lack of information on stock prices and 
another 2 because their defense revenue was less than 10% of total revenue. Our 
final sample consists of 20 US firms. We use daily returns for each firm. The 
stock price series are extracted from Datastream. The time period extends from 
March 2001 to March 18, 2003. We choose to focus on the September 11 effects 
and therefore do not go beyond March 18 because the Bush administration 
decided to invade Iraq on March 19, 2003.  
Table 1 shows the list of US defense firms and the distribution of defense revenue 
to total revenue in our final sample. 
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TABLE 1: The list of US defense firms 
Firms  (% Sales) 
Lockheed Martin Corp.  93.80 
Oshkosh Truck Corp.  29.3 
Alliant Techsystems  88.9 
L-3 Communications Corp. 76.9 
Boeing Co. 32.6 
United Technologies Corp. 13.6 
Harris Corp. 42.4 
Northrop Grumman 68.9 
ITT Industries 27.9 
Kaman Corp. 34.4 
General Dynamics Corp. 64 
Jacob Engineering Group Inc. 18.5 
Titan Corp. 78.6 
Raytheon Co. 71 
URS 15.1 
Computer Sciences Corp. 15.8 
Textron Inc. 11.7 
Cubic Corp. 56.2 
DRS Technologies Inc. 97.1 
Teledyne Technologies 37 
The sample consists of twenty firms. The sales data are from a defense news media group in 2001. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Short-term performance of US defense firms 
  
Table 2 presents the SUR estimates for equation 1. The estimates provide the basis 
for testing whether September 11 contained new information for defense firms. 
TABLE 2: Short-term performance of US defense firms after September 11, 2001. 
Firms  
iα  iβ  iδ  'iα  'iβ  
Lockheed Martin Corp.  0.0002 
(0.0015) 
0.4002* 
(0.1123) 
0.1381* 
(0.0180) 
0.0018 
(0.0021) 
-0.3389* 
(0.1711) 
Oshkosh Truck Corp.  -0.0018 
(0.0026) 
0.5470* 
(0.1995) 
0.0819* 
(0.0320) 
0.0042 
(0.0038) 
-0.0110 
(0.3039) 
Alliant Techsystems  0.0015 
(0.0021) 
0.4148* 
(0.1574) 
0.1869* 
(0.0252) 
0.0003 
(0.0030) 
-0.3787 
(0.2397) 
L-3 Communications Corp. -0.0021 
(0.0019) 
0.8346* 
(0.1433) 
0.3368* 
(0.0230) 
0.0039 
(0.0027) 
-0.5215* 
(0.2182) 
Boeing Co. -0.0022 
(0.0018) 
0.8152* 
(0.1367) 
-0.1351* 
(0.0219) 
0.0031 
(0.0026) 
0.3619 
(0.2082) 
United Technologies Corp. -0.0009 
(0.0016) 
0.9183* 
(0.1242) 
-0.2739* 
(0.0199) 
0.0032 
(0.0023) 
0.2712 
(0.1892) 
Harris Corp. 0.0021 
(0.0020) 
1.3127* 
(0.1532) 
0.1119* 
(0.0246) 
-0.0012 
(0.0029) 
-0.9310* 
(0.2334) 
Northrop Grumman -0.0007 
(0.0016) 
0.4959* 
(0.1176) 
0.1349* 
(0.0189) 
0.0020 
(0.0022) 
-0.6864* 
(0.1791) 
ITT Industries 0.0011 
(0.0012) 
0.6659* 
(0.0881) 
0.0012 
(0.0141) 
0.0013 
(0.0017) 
-0.0543 
(0.1342) 
Kaman Corp. -0.0009 
(0.0029) 
0.7120* 
(0.2150) 
0.0761* 
(0.0345) 
0.0007 
(0.0041) 
0.0552 
(0.3275) 
General Dynamics Corp. 0.0010 
(0.0017) 
0.5733 
(0.1290) 
0.1096* 
(0.0207) 
-0.0008 
(0.0024) 
-0.1295 
(0.1964) 
Jacob Engineering Group Inc. 0.0007 
(0.0022) 
0.5913 
(0.1685) 
0.1011* 
(0.0270) 
-0.0002 
(0.0032) 
0.1565 
(0.2566) 
Titan Corp. -0.0014 
(0.0033) 
1.7787* 
(0.2458) 
0.1943* 
(0.0394) 
0.0004 
(0.0046) 
-0.6116 
(0.3743) 
Raytheon Co. -0.0012 
(0.0021) 
0.3404* 
(0.1563) 
0.2316* 
(0.0251) 
0.0032 
(0.0029) 
-0.4120 
(0.2380) 
URS -0.0003 
(0.0024) 
0.6941* 
(0.1845) 
0.1584* 
(0.0296 
0.0033 
(0.0035) 
-0.0842 
(0.2809) 
Computer Sciences Corp. -0.0031 1.6021* -0.0053 0.0061 -0.9260* 
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(0.0036) (0.2692) (0.0432 (0.0051) (0.4099) 
Textron Inc. -0.0007 
(0.0021) 
0.8161* 
(0.1554) 
-0.0370 
(0.0249 
-0.0001 
(0.0029) 
0.5635* 
(0.2367) 
Cubic Corp. 0.0000 
(0.0025) 
0.6584* 
(0.1874) 
0.0968* 
(0.0300) 
0.0058 
(0.0035) 
-0.1061 
(0.2854) 
DRS Technologies Inc. 0.0028 
(0.0029) 
0.5161* 
(0.2213) 
0.2183* 
(0.0355) 
-0.0010 
(0.0042) 
-0.4565 
(0.3370) 
Teledyne Technologies 0.0004 
(0.0018) 
0.8835* 
(0.1329) 
-0.0116 
(0.0213) 
-0.0019 
(0.0025) 
0.3650 
(0.2024) 
 H2 H3 
F-statistic 27.69* 25.15* 
The equation is as follows:: tiimtaiaitmiiti DRDDRR ,1., '' εδβαβα +++++= Where 
tiR ,  is the return on firm i at time t, tmR . is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index 
at time t, aD is a dummy variable that takes the value of one after September 11 and zero 
otherwise, 1D  is a dummy variable that takes the value of one on September 17 and zero 
otherwise, iδ is the parameter used to measure the abnormal return on the event window for firm i, 
and ti,ε is the error term from the regression on date t for firm i. The term is treated as normally 
distributed with a mean of zero and a constant. H2 is the hypothesis testing whether the δ 's all are 
equal to zero. H3 is the hypothesis testing whether all the δ 's are equal among themselves. The 
sample period goes from March 2001 to March 2002. Data sources: Datastream. * represents 
significant coefficients at the 5% level. 
 
 
The results indicate that September 11 had a positive and significant effect on 
70% of our sample. The abnormal returns for the firms range from 7% to 33%. In 
addition, the percentage of defense sales to total sales is usually higher than 40% 
for the firms. We also notice that only 10% of our sample exhibits a significant 
negative return on September 17. Further, five out of twenty firms in our sample 
show a significant decline in their beta after the attack. The negative coefficients 
indicate that the beta of the firms may have decreased in September and the 
following period. This decline occurs again for firms with defense revenue higher 
than 40% of total revenue.  
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The H2 and H3 tests are also presented. The F test rejects the null hypothesis that 
there was no impact on abnormal returns after the September 11 attack (H2). We 
also reject H3. These results indicate that the market does not price all firms in the 
same way. Even though such an event has a large emotional impact, investors 
seem to differentiate between firms.  
The results from the table 2 indicate that defense sales could serve as a good 
measure with which to assess the degree of exposure to the September 11 attack. 
Accordingly, we subdivide our sample into two portfolios based on the percentage 
of defense revenue to total revenue, thereby giving rise to: (1) firms with high 
defense revenue and (2) firms with low defense revenue. To classify a firm with 
high defense revenue, the percentage of defense revenue to total revenue should 
be higher than the median of the sample. We then re-estimate equation 1 for the 
two portfolios. Table 3 shows that the portfolio with low defense sales exhibits a 
positive and statistically significant abnormal returns. However, the impact of 
September 11 was not statistically significant for firms with low defense sales. 
The latter result indicates that the existence of fewer defense activities in these 
firms helped them to minimize the effect of the September 11 attack.  
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TABLE 3: Return equations of portfolios of US defenses firms 
 
iα  iβ  iδ  'iα  'iβ  
LDSF -0.0008 
(0.0011) 
0.8245* 
(0.0795) 
-0.0044 
(0.0127) 
0.0020 
(0.0015) 
0.0698 
(0.1210) 
HDSF 0.0002 
(0.0011) 
0.7325* 
(0.0812) 
0.1759* 
(0.0130) 
0.0014 
(0.0015) 
-0.4572* 
(0.1236) 
 H2 H3 
F-statistic 95.007* 132.09* 
The equations are as follows: 
 tiimtaiaitmiiti DRDDRR ,1., '' εδβαβα +++++=   
tjjmtajajtmjjtj DRDDRR ,1., '' εδβαβα +++++=  Where i is the index associated with 
the low defense revenue portfolio (LDSF) and j is the index associated with the high defense 
revenue portfolio (HDSF), tiR , ( tjR , ) is the return on portfolio i (j) at time t, tmR . is the return on 
the CRSP value-weighted market index at time t, aD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one after September 11 and zero otherwise, 1D  is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
on September 11 and zero otherwise, iδ )( jδ is the parameter used to measure the abnormal 
return on the event window for portfolio i (j), and ti,ε )( ,tjε is the error term from the regression 
on date t for portfolio i (j). The term is treated as normally distributed with a mean of zero and a 
constant variance. H2 is the hypothesis testing whether the δ 's all are equal to zero. H3 is the 
hypothesis testing whether all the δ 's are equal to each other. The sample period goes from 
March 2001 to March 2002. Data sources: Datastream. * represents significant coefficients at the 
5% level. 
 
 
In order to assess the validity of our results based on portfolio formation, we also 
regress a firm’s excess returns on the percentage of defense revenue to total 
revenue as continuous variables. Results reported in table 4 indicate that, for our 
event window, the defense revenue factor is statistically positive at the 5% level. 
 
Short and Long-Term Effects of September 11 on Stock Returns 17  
TABLE 4: Cross-sectional regression of abnormal returns for the event day 
Parameter Coefficient Standard error 
Constant -0.0708 0.0454 
%DS 0.0032* 0.0008 
R2 0.47  
F-statistic 15.88*  
This table presents cross sectional regression for the abnormal returns of defense firms on 
September 11, 2001. %DS is total defense sales to total sales. * represents significant coefficients 
at the 5% level. 
 
5.2. Long-term performance of US defense firms 
 
The 12- and 18-month BHARs are reported in table 6. When the returns are 
equally weighted, the US defense firms outperform the market index by 27.52% 
after one year. The positive abnormal returns of US defense firms diminish 
substantially when returns are value weighted for the same holding period. After 
one year, the value-weighted BHARs are only 1.68%. When we investigate 
whether our value-weighted BHARs are driven by a few large firms by excluding 
Boeing from our sample (a weight average of approximately 30%), the 
value-weighted BHARs are not different from the equally-weighted BHARs. For 
an investor buying US defense firms after September 11, 2001 and holding them 
for 18 months, the US defense firms trail the market by an average of 1.07% and 
0.48% for equally-weighted and value-weighted returns respectively.  
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Due to the skewness of the BHAR distribution, the bootstrapping method 
suggested by Lyon et al. (1999) was used. The bootstrapped skewness-adjusted 
t-statistics are reported in table 5 and show that the results are not markedly 
different from when we use the conventional t statistics.  
TABLE 5: Long-term performance of US defense firms  
 
Panel A reports the 12- and 18-month buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) which are measured as 
follows:  
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Where itr  is the daily return for firm i on day t and mtr  is the return on the CRSP 
value-weighted market index for the same day. The holding period begins with the first trading 
after September 11 (T1). T2 is the last day of the holding period. The equally-weighted average 
and value-weighted average are calculated for each holding period. The weight is the relative 
market capitalization of a defense firm in the sample. 
Panel B reports the 12- and 18-month cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) which are measured as 
follows: 
Panel A 
 
Long-term measure 12 months 18 months 
BHARs Equally-weighted 
t-statistic 
Bootstrapped skewness-adj. 
27.52% 
3.07* 
2.95* 
-1.07% 
-0.12 
-0.13 
Value-weighted 
t-statistic 
Bootstrapped skewness-adj. 
1.68% 
1.56 
2.39* 
-0.48% 
-0.93 
-1.29 
 Panel B Long-term measure 12 months 18 months 
CARs Equally-weighted 
t-statistic 
 
24.06% 
2.53* 
-2.73% 
-0.21 
Value-weighted 
t-statistic 
 
0.79% 
2.36* 
-0.29% 
-0.49 
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mtitTT rrCAR  Where itr  is the daily return for firm i on day t and mtr  is the 
return on the CRSP value-weighted market index for the same day. The holding period starts with 
the first trading day after September 11, 2001. T2 is the last day of the holding period. The 
equally-weighted average and value-weighted average are calculated for each holding period. The 
weight is the relative market capitalization of a defense firm in the sample. 
The sample period goes from September 11, 2001 to March 18, 2003. Data sources: Datastream.  
* represents significant coefficients at the 5% level. 
 
 
We calculate abnormal performance using the cumulative abnormal return 
approach. The results reported in table 7 indicate that the equally-weighted 12- 
and 18-month returns are respectively 24.06% and -2.73% for US defense firms. 
As with the BHARs, the value-weighted CARs tend to decrease the degree of 
over-performance for the 12-month holding period, this decrease being explained 
by the existence of Boeing in our sample. The results indicate that the 
equally-weighted and value-weighted BHARs of US defense firms for the 18 
month-holding period are negative but not statistically significant. 
 
As a final check of the robustness of our results, we use the Fama and French 
three factor model. Table 8 reports the 12- and 18-month performance of US 
defense firms using the intercept from the Fama and French three factor regression. 
The ordinary least regression is presented in table 8. The intercept is positive and 
statistically different from zero when we use the equally-weighted portfolio over 
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the 12-month holding period.4 However, the magnitude of the abnormal returns is 
lower when we use the value-weighted portfolio, and the intercept in this case is 
not statistically significant. Once again, the existence of Boeing in our sample 
could explain the decline. For instance, when we exclude this firm from our 
sample, the intercept becomes statistically significant. When we examine the 
18-month holding period, we find that US defense firms earn negative abnormal 
returns. The under-performance is not statistically significant for both equally- and 
value-weighted US defense firms.  
TABLE 6: Long-term performance of US defense firms using the Fama and French 
three-factor approach 
Panel A Holding period: 12 months 
 
Equally-weighted Value-weighted 
α  0.0016 
(0.0008) 
0.0005 
(0.0009) 
β  0.5407 
(0.0652) 
0.9392 
(0.0740) 
                                                 
4
 For the robustness check, we also consider monthly returns instead of daily returns to 
estimate the intercept since the usage of the monthly returns are less susceptible to the bad 
asset-pricing model problem. The results are not affected by this change. 
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γ  0.3868 
(0.1284) 
0.2125 
(0.1453) 
λ  -0.2093 
(0.1540) 
0.1265 
(0.1749) 
Panel B Holding period: 18 months 
 
Equally-weighted Value-weighted 
α  -0.0003 
(0.0006) 
-0.0002 
(0.0007) 
β  0.8382 
(0.0482) 
1.0001 
(0.0569) 
γ  0.2063 
(0.1017) 
0.1878 
(0.1199) 
λ  0.2820 
(0.1197) 
0.3763 
(0.1411) 
The returns of the portfolio are used to estimate the Fama and French three-factor approach as 
follows: ( ) tttftmtftt HmlSMBrrrr ελγβα +++−+=−  Where tr is the calendar time 
portfolio of defense firms on day t and ftr is the risk free return for the same day t. The 
independent variables of the regression are the excess market return ( ftmt rr − ), the difference in 
returns of value-weighted portfolios of small firms and large stocks ( tSMB ), and the difference in 
returns of value-weighted portfolios of high book to market stocks and low book to market stocks 
( tHML ). We have constructed SMB and HML in keeping with Fama and French (1993). The 
intercept term α is used as an indicator of risk-adjusted performance of the defense firms. The 
sample period goes from September 11, 2001 to March 18, 2003. Data sources: Datastream. * 
represents significant coefficients at the 5% level. 
 
5. 3 Robustness Check  
In the previous section, we used multivariate equation estimates to investigate the 
presence of abnormal returns in our sample. In this section, we model conditional 
residual variances using the GARCH process. The objective is to examine whether 
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abnormal returns found are still present when we use a different estimation 
approach.  
 
In an event study framework, this adjustment is important when the event results 
in changes in volatility. Indeed, the abnormal returns identified in an event study 
could be due to a change in volatility rather than a change in the required return 
(Brown, Harlow and Ticnic, 1998).  
In order to do that, we use GARCH.  When using a GARCH parameterization, 
we let Γ  be a 2 x 2 positive definite matrix, B be a symmetric 2 x 2 matrix for 
GARCH effects, A be a symmetric 2 x 2 matrix for ARCH effects, itε  is the 
vector ( )', jtit εε  which follows a bivariate normal distribution of mean zero and 
conditional variance tH . The conditional variance model we consider is as 
follows 
'A'A'BBHH 1t1t1tt −−− εε++Γ= . (5) 
Table (5) indicates that the behaviour of abnormal returns does not change 
markedly following the GARCH modeling of conditional residual variances. We 
also reran all of the previous analyses using the MSCI index return instead of the 
CRSP weighted average index. Results are not reported here and are not 
significantly affected by this change.  
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TABLE 7: Return equations of portfolios of US defense firms  
using a bivariate  GARCH model  
 
iα  iβ  iδ  'iα  'iβ  
LDSF 0.0009 
(0.0007) 
0.7704* 
(0.0688) 
-0.0105 
(0.00118) 
0.0008 
(0.0011) 
0.1109 
(0.1101) 
HDSF 0.0002 
(0.0008) 
0.7428* 
(0.0500) 
0.1634* 
(0.0059) 
0.0008 
(0.0013) 
-0.3121* 
(0.1105) 
The equations are as follows: 
tiimtaiaitmiiti DRDDRR ,1., '' εδβαβα +++++=   
tjjmtajajtmjjtj DRDDRR ,1., '' εδβαβα +++++=   
H t = Γ + BH 1−t B'+A 1−tε  ε  ' 1−t A'    
Where i is the index associated with the low defense revenue portfolio and j is the index associated 
with the high defense revenue portfolio, tiR , ( tjR , ) is the return on portfolio i (j) at time t, tmR . is 
the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index at time t, aD is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one after September 11 and zero otherwise, 1D  is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one on September 17 and zero otherwise, iδ )( jδ is the parameter used to measure the 
abnormal return on the event window for portfolio i (j), and ti,ε )( ,tjε is the error term from the 
regression on date t for portfolio i (j). The term is treated as normally distributed with a mean of 
zero and conditional variance tH .* represents significant coefficients under robust standard errors 
(Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992) at the 5% level of significance. Standard error are in parentheses. 
The sample period goes from March 2001 to March 2002. Data sources: Datastream. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the short- and long-term performance of the US 
defense industry in the aftermath of September 11. We use a multivariate 
regression analysis to test a number of hypotheses, including whether the market 
reaction was the same for each firm or whether the market differentiated based on 
differences among defense firms. We find that defense firms are not equally 
exposed to the September 11 attack. Indeed, 60% of our sample exhibit significant 
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negative abnormal returns. In addition, the impact is not statistically significant for 
almost one third of our sample. More importantly, we find that investors 
distinguish between defense firms based on the level of defense sales. In the 
long-term, given the sensitivity of abnormal performance to specific measurement 
methods, we use three different metrics. The first is the buy-and-hold return in 
excess of the market return. The second is the daily cumulative abnormal return, 
which is a less biased method for assessing the long-term return (Fama, 1998; 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). The last is the Fama and French multifactor model 
in which the daily calendar-time return on a portfolio of defense firms is regressed 
on three factors (Fama and French, 1993). The model is used to control for event 
clustering and cross correlation in defense firms. Our results indicate that US 
defense firms exhibit positive abnormal returns after twelve months. However, 
when we examine the 18-month holding period, we find that the US defense firms 
earn negative abnormal returns. Nonetheless, the under-performance is not 
statistically significant for both equally- and value-weighted US defense firms.  
These results make an appreciable contribution to research related to terrorism and 
stock markets through their discussion of the long-term effect of terrorism on 
firms' returns. We also show how some firms could benefit from terrorism 
activities such as the September 11 event. Finally, in spite of the emotional impact 
of this event, our results are consistent with the proposition of rational pricing in 
the U.S. financial markets and suggest that the market differentiated among 
defense firms. 
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